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STATUTORY OR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES 
U.OA. 77-13-6.Withdrawal of plea. 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to 
conviction. 
(2)(a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of 
the court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except for a 
plea held in abeyance, shall be made by motion before sentence is 
announced. Sentence may not be announced unless the motion is denied. For a 
plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw the plea shall be made within 
30 days of pleading guilty or no contest. 
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period 
specified in Subsection (2)(b) snaii be pursued under Title 78, 
Chapter 35a, Post-Conviction Remedies Act, and Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no 
contest or guilty and mentally ill, and may not accept the 
plea until the court has found: 
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or 
she has knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not 
desire counsel; 
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption 
of innocence, the right against compulsory 
self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial 
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and 
cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the 
right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and 
that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements 
of the offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial 
the prosecution would have the burden of proving each of 
those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea 
is an admission of all those elements; 
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual 
basis is sufficient if it establishes that the charged crime 
was actually committed by the defendant or, if the defendant 
refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that 
the prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a 
substantial risk of conviction; 
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, 
and if applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the 
minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each offense to 
which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the 
imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea 
discussion and plea agreement, and if so, what agreement has 
been reached; 
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for 
filing any motion to withdraw the plea; and 
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of 
appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant 
on the record or, if used, a written statement reciting 
these factors after the court has 'stahiished that the 
defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the 
contents of the statement. If the defendant cannot 
understand the English language, it will be sufficient that 
the statement has been read or translated to the defendant. 
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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
Authority for said appeal is found within the confine of Rule 26 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure; Utah State Constitution Article 1, Section 12; Utah 
Code Annotated Section 77-1 6(g); and Section 78-2-2 (i) Utah Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
Defendant entered a plea to the charge of 'burglary', a third degree felony. 
Prior to sentencing, the defendant filed a motion to withdraw his plea asserting his 
innocence to the charge and asserting that his conduct, if illegal, was a violation of 
the trespassing statute not the burglary statute. 
Defendant asserts that he was not fully advised how the trespassing statute 
more appropriately proscribed his conduct as opposed to the burglary statute. 
The Court denied the motion to withdraw the plea and sentenced the 
defendant based on the plea of guilty to the 'burglary' charge. 
Defendant contends the plea should have been withdrawn and he allowed to 
present his case to a jury. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an appeal from a third degree felony conviction for burglary, a violation 
of U.C.A. 76-6-202. The defendant motion to withdraw his plea and the motion was 
denied by the trial court. The defendant now appeals. 
RELEVANT FACTUAL STATEMENT 
The defendant was convicted of 'burglary', a violation of 76-6-202. On 
February 14, 2006 the defendant entered a plea of guilty to the offense of burglary. 
The factual statement offered by the State at the arraignment merely restated the 
burglary statute's elements — the defendant entered with an intent to assault. 
Transcript page 5 lines 6-9. 
Prior to sentencing, the defendant then motioned the Court to allow him to 
withdraw his plea of guilty. On June 20,2006, the Court denied the motion to 
withdraw the plea and the defendant was then sentenced on August 7,2006. 
The charge is based on the defendant's entrance into a home of another. Mr. 
Bunker was looking for an Isaac Woods. 
The Court's ruling found that the Mr. Bunker was carrying a flashlight and he 
had used abusive language looking for an Isaac Woods. When Mr. Woods was not 
located, the defendant then left. The Court further found that no assault, theft, nor 
felony occurred during at the home. When the police encountered the defendant 
later, the defendant reported the 'it would have been ugly' if Mr. Woods had been 
found. 
Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea asserted that his conduct was a 
trespass and not a burglary. Defendant compared the statutes (U.C.A. 76-6-202 
(Burglary) and U.C.A. 76-2-206 (trespassing)) and concluded that his conduct was 
proscribed more appropriately under the trespassing statute. Defendant further cited 
State v.Shondell, 22 Utah 2d 343,453 P.2d 146 (1969) arguing when the criminal 
conduct is defined by two competing statutes, the defendant is entitled to the lesser 
charge. U.C.A. 77-17-1. 
Denying the motion to withdraw the plea, the Court found the defendant to 
have knowingly and voluntarily entered his guilty plea. Page 2 of Court's 
Memorandum Decision. The Court did, however, note that the defendant had not 
been advised by previous counsel of the possible application of the trespassing 
statute. 
The trial court then proceeded with an analysis on a determination of 
ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668,687-
88 (1984). The Court found prior counsel's performance not deficient and the 
defendant not prejudiced. 
The trial court found that trespecc is a lesser included offense to the charge 
of burglary. The trial court distinguished this conduct as a 'burglary'. Based solely 
on the language "it would have been ugly", the trial court concluded that Mr. Bunker 
entered the home with intent to assault. The Court did not address the issue why the 
same language "it could have been ugly", did not fall under the trespass statute. 
U.C.A. 76-2-206. 
Defendant argued that it would a violation of the equal protection clause to 
convict the defendant of 'burglary' as c l osed to 'trespass' since the statutes cover 
the same proscribed conduct. This motion was also denied. 
BRIEF STATEMENT OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant entered the home of Mr. Woods. The only evidence to suggest 
his intent once inside the home was a statement to police that "it would have been 
ugly". 
The provisions of U.C.A. 76-6-206 proscribe the defendant's conduct. 
U.C.A. 76-6-206 provides: 
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, under circumstances 
(a) he enters or remains unlawfully on property and: 
(i) intends to cause annoyance or injury to any person or damage to 
any property,... 
(ii) intends to commit any crime, other than theft or a felony; or 
The State charged the defendant with 'burglary' alleging he entered the home with the 
intent to assault. The terminology that "it would have been ugly" does not fall within the 
'burglary' statute and should have been held to be within the lesser charge of 'trespass'. 
DETAILED ARGUMENT 
The provisions of U.C.A. 76-6-206 (trespass) proscribes the defendant's 
conduct. U.C.A. 76-6-206 (2) provides: 
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, under circumstances 
not amounting to burglary...: 
(a) he enters or remains unlawfully on property and: 
(i) intends to cause annoyance or injury to any person or damage to 
any property,...; 
(iv) intends to commit any crime, other than theft or a felony; . . . 
In deference to the plea, the trial court found the language "it would have 
been ugly" as dispositive of the element 'intent to assault'. This as opposed to the 
trespass element of intent to commit "annoyance or injury to any person or damage 
to any property". The trial court's conclusion requires an improper inference or 
presumption beyond what the facts justify. The law cannot presume an intention 
beyond what was so realized. State v. Castonauav. 663 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1983). 
The trial court analysis hinged on the performance of previous counsel and 
whether such conduct was deficient. The trial court overlooked the recent appellate 
court decision finding ineffective assistance of counsel. In State v. Ison, 2006 Ut 
26,135 P.3d 864, the court found ineffective where the failure to admit the findings 
of an Administrative Law Judge as evidence. In State v. Perez-Avila, 2006 UT App 
71 131 P.3d 864 the Court found in a similar case to the present that counsel's 
performance was deficient for failing note a DUI charge to be a lesser included 
offense to automobile homicide. In State v. Hernandez, 2005 UT App 546,128 
P.3d 556 found ineffective assistance because trial counsel failed to investigate 
crucial defense witnesses. 
The Court further suggested that defendant suffered no prejudice. The court 
overlooks the obvious prejudice of a felony conviction as opposed to a 
misdemeanor conviction. 
Defendant argues that the analysis herein should be based on whether a 
defendant "knowingly and voluntarily" entered his plea as opposed to an analysis of 
whether counsel's performance was sufficient. U.C.A. 77-13-6. 
KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY ENTERS A PLEA 
A plea of guilty may be withdrawn upon a showing that it was not knowingly and 
voluntarily made. U.C.A. 77-13-6. Rule 11(e)(4)(A) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure requires the defendant understands the nature and elements of the 
offense to which the plea is entered. 
Case law suggests that "a guilty plea must be knowingly and voluntarily made 
in order to protect a defendant's due process rights." State v. Mora, 2003 Ut App 
117,69 P.3d 838. If that process is not followed, under Utah law there is a presumed 
harm. See also Bluemel v. State, 2006 UT App 141,134 P.3d 181. 
Unless he is fully advised, a defendant cannot make a fully informed decision. 
'Knowingly' mandates that the defendant understands the law and how his conduct 
applies to the charged offense. This would suggest an understanding of the 
elements of the offense. 
In State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187-88 (Utah 1987, the Court found the 
term "knowingly" to include a full understanding as applied to the right to counsel. 
Frampton required a sixteen point inquiry of the right to counsel. See also State v. 
Ferguson, 2007 Ut 1, No. 20050376; State v. Houston, 2006 UT App 437 147 P.3d 
543. 
To sustain this plea, defendant must have a full comprehension of the law 
respecting the elements of the offense charged. The only factual basis offered by the 
State was a repeat of the statutory elements of burglary. 
The defendant should have also a full understanding of the elements to the 
offense and be able to distinguish between the offense charged and any lesser 
included offenses as here. 
If the trial court's colloquy fails to demonstrate such knowledge, the plea 
should be withdrawn. 
CONCLUSION 
The motion to withdraw defendant's plea should have been granted. The 
Court improperly concluded the language "it would have been ugly' met statutory 
elements of the burglary statute. This inference of intent could have just as well 
inferred the statutory elements of trespass — he entered with the intent to cause an 
annoyance or injury to person or property. 
The defendant did not have a full understanding the elements of the offense 
pled. Failing a knowledgeable and voluntary plea of guilty, the motion to withdraw 
such plea must be withdrawn. 
DATED this 14th day of February, 2007. 
Attorney for the defendant 
ADDENDUM 
1. Trial Court decision. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DARRELL BUNKER, 
Defendant. 
RULING AND ORDER DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS TO 
WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA AND TO 
DISMISS 
Case No. 051403057 
Judge Samuel D. McVey 
Defendant timely filed his Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea before sentencing. Defendant 
also filed a Motion to Dismiss the charge to which he pleaded guilty. The Court, having carefully 
considered and reviewed the record in this matter and the memoranda submitted by the parties, 
makes the following ruling and order. 
I. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND 
On May 14, 2005, defendant, Darrell Bunker, went to the home of Wendy Wood around 
midnight and pounded on the door. Ms. Wood's fourteen year old daughter answered the door. 
Defendant stated he was searching for Isaac Wood, who also lived at the home. Defendant carried 
a large flashlight that looked like a crow bar to Ms. Wood's daughter. He used abusive language. 
When informed Isaac was not home, defendant entert u the home uninvited and searched several 
rooms of the house for Isaac, despite being asked to leave by Ms. Wood's daughter. After failing to 
find Isaac in the house, defendant searched the yard and vehicles in the driveway. Also failing to 
find Isaac outside, defendant left. 
Defendant later met with officers who contacted him after Ms. Wood informed them of her 
daughter's encounter with him. At that time, defendant disclosed to officers that he had entered the 
home with intent to assault Isaac, specifically stating that it "would have been ugly" had he found 
Isaac at home that night. Defendant was charged with burglary under section 76-6-202 of the Utah 
Code and eventually pled guilty to burglary as a third-degree felony on February 14, 2006. In 
exchange for his plea, the State reduced the charge from second-degree felony burglary. The State 
also agreed to recommend probation for two years, work release if defendant were sentenced to 
serve time in jail, and a possible reduction of the charge to a class A misdemeanor pursuant to 
section 76-3-402 of the Utah Code. However, prior to sentencing, defendant filed the present 
motions. 
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ANALYSIS AND RULING 
Defendant argues he entered a guilty plea to burglary based only on prior counsel's advice, 
defendant claims prior counsel's advice was poor because the facts of his case constitute criminal 
trespass rather than burglary. Defendant also argues his burglary charge should be dismissed because 
both the burglary and criminal trespass statutes cover the same conduct. Thus, he argues he should 
only be sentenced under the criminal trespass statute, which provides for the lesser penalty. 
The State argues defendant was properly advised by prior counsel and entered his guilty plea 
to burglary knowingly and voluntarily after a proper colloquy. The State also argues defendant's acts 
were properly charged as burglary and that the burglary and criminal trespass statutes are clearly 
distinguishable from one another. Further, the State contends defendant's motion to dismiss is moot 
because defendant already pled guilty to burglary. 
A. Defendant's Guilty Plea Was Entered Knowingly and Voluntarily 
Withdrawal of guilty pleas is governed by section 77-13-6(2)(a) of the Utah Code Annotated, 
which provides, "[a] plea of guilty... may be withdrawn only upon leave of the court and a showing 
that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made." Strict compliance with rule 11 (e) of the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, which we have here and which has not been challenged by defendant, creates 
a presumption a plea was voluntarily entered. State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, ^[11, 1 P.3d 1108. 
However, defendant argues he was misdirected by former counsel in entering his plea of 
guilty to burglary as a third degree felony. Defendant argues he was denied effective assistance of 
counsel because former counsel failed to advise him his actions may have amounted only to criminal 
trespass, a misdemeanor, rather than burglary. Defendant claims he entered his guilty plea in 
reliance upon poor advice of counsel, making his plea unknowing. 
The Strickland test applies to guilty pleas challenged on the basis of ineffective assistance 
of counsel. State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, \\6,26 P.3d 203 (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 
58 (1985)). Under the Strickland test, one has been denied effective assistance of counsel where: 
(1) counsel's performance was deficient below an objective standard of reasonable professional 
judgment, and (2) counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant. Id. (citing Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)). In the context of a guilty plea, to show prejudice a 
"defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would 
not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Id. (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 59). 
In the case at hand, defendant has not made a sufficient showing prior counsel's performance 
was deficient or he was prejudiced by that performance. Defendant claims prior counsel should 
have informed him that his acts constituted criminal trespass rather than burglary. The facts of this 
case involve unlawful entry with intent to commit an assault. To commit burglary a person must 
enter or remain unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with intent to commit an assault, 
a theft, or a felony. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-202(1 )(a)-©) (1999). Burglary is a third degree felony 
unless it is committed in a dwelling, in which case it is a second degree felony. UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 76-6-202(2) (1999). The relevant portion of the criminal trespass statute requires that under 
circumstances not amounting to burglary, one enters or remains unlawfully on property and intends 
Page 2 of 6 
to cause annoyance or injury to any person or damage to any property, or intends to commit any 
crime other than theft or a felony. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-206(2)(a)(I)-(ii) (1999). Criminal 
trespass is a class C misdemeanor unless it is committed in a dwelling, in which case it is a class B 
misdemeanor. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76~6-206(3)(a) (1999). 
Criminal trespass has been found to be a lesser included offense of burglary, with the primary 
difference between the offenses a differing mens rea. See State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 159 (Utah 
1983). However, in burglary trials courts have not been required to instruct juries on the lesser 
offense of criminal trespass unless the evidence was ambiguous or subject to an alternative 
interpretation. Id (where the evidence showed a former employee broke into a gas station, 
rummaged through a desk, and hid in a closet when the owner and police arrived, the evidence was 
not ambiguous or subject to any alternative interpretation and thus the court was not required to 
instruct on the lesser offense of criminal trespass). 
The facts of this case clearly provide a basis for defendant's plea of guilty to burglary. 
Defendant entered the home unlawfully without the const u« «>rMs. Wood's teenage daughter and 
remained after he was asked to leave. He carried a flashlight that Ms. Wood's daughter mistook for 
a crowbar. It could have been used as a weapon. Most tellingly, he displayed an angry and abusive 
disposition in entering the home and in his search for Isaac Wood. He later admitted to police that 
he intended to assault Isaac in the home. Although defendant contends that no assault actually 
occurred while in the home, all the burglary statute requires is intent to commit an assault. The 
foregoing conduct amounts to burglary rather than criminal trespass because defendant specifically 
had intent to commit an assault while in the home unlawfully. Moreover, since courts do not have 
instruct juries on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass where the facts are unambiguous, 
it was not objectively deficient for counsel to fail to advise defendant that his conduct might amount 
to criminal trespass rather than burglary. Defendant was not misled as the evidence in this case is 
not ambiguous or subject to an alternative interpretation. 
Finally, prior counsel succeeded in obtaining a favorable disposition for defendant, as 
defendant was able to plead guilty to burglary as a third degree felony rather than risk conviction of 
a second degree felony. Defendant's plea agreement provided him with the benefit of work release 
and his plea included a stipulation from the state to recommend a reduction of his conviction to a 
class A misdemeanor pursuant to Utah Code § 76-3-402. i'nor counsel also filed the 402 motion 
prior to being replaced. Thus, defendant got a good deal- a "meaningful benefit in exchange for 
[his] guilty plea[, which] is an additional indication that counsel acted reasonably in advising the 
defendant to accept the plea." State v. Marvin, 964 P.2d 313, 317 (Utah 1998). 
Defendant also fails to show sufficient prejudice. Although defendant contends his conduct 
was not burglary and that he would not have pleaded guilty but for prior counsel's advice, his 
assertions are not dispositive. Even had defendant been advised of the possibility of arguing the 
alternative of criminal trespass to a jury, he received a substantial bargain in return for his guilty plea 
to burglary as a third degree felony, including avoiding the risk a jury might convict him of burglary 
as a second degree felony; or the court might not have agreed to provide a jury instruction for the 
lesser included offense of criminal trespass. Other than his assertion that his conduct was not 
burglary, defendant has not adequately shown a reasonable probability that he would have insisted 
on going to trial but for prior counsel's advice. 
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Therefore, because defendant has not shown prior counsel's performance was deficient below 
an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, and because defendant has not shown the 
necessary prejudice, his motion to withdraw his plea is denied. 
B. Defendant Was Properly Charged With Burglary 
In his motion to dismiss, defendant argues the burglary and criminal trespass statutes 
proscribe the same conduct and he should have been charged with criminal trespass rather than 
burglary under the "doctrine" specified in State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146, 147-48 (Utah 1969). 
Defendant also argues the overlap between the statutes violates his right to equal protection. The 
State argues the Shondel doctrine is inapplicable here because the burglary and criminal trespass 
statutes proscribe different conduct. 
Shondel provided where two statutes define exactly the same penal offense, a defendant can 
be sentenced only under the statute with the lesser penalty. State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, f33,53 P.3d 
1210 (citing State v. Shondel, supra, 453 P.2d at 147-48). However, rule "necessarily applies only 
when the two statutes address 'exactly the same conduct.'" Id. (quoting State v. Gomez, 722 P.2d 
747,749 (Utah 1986)). Thus, if the elements of the crimes are not identical and "the relevant statutes 
require proof of some fact or element not required to establish the other, the statutes do not proscribe 
the same conduct." State v. Jensen, 2004 UT App467,fl6,105P.3d951 (quoting State v. Green, 
2000 UT App 33, f6,995 P.2d 1250). Thus, Utah courts compare the plain language of the statutes 
to determine if they cover the same conduct and if their elements are wholly duplicative. Id. 
In this case, Shondel is inapplicable because sections 76-6-202 and 76-6-206 of the Utah 
Code do not prohibit the exact same conduct. The facts of this case involve unlawful entry with 
intent to commit an assault. The relevant burglary statute provides a person must enter or remain 
unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with intent to commit an assault, a theft, or a 
felony. UTAHCODE ANN. §76-6-202(l)(a)-(c) (1999). The relevant portion ofthe criminal trespass 
statute requires that under circumstances not amounting to burglary, one enters or remains 
unlawfully on property and intends to cause annoyance or injury to any person or damage to any 
property, or intends to commit any crime other than theft or a felony. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-
206(2)(a)(I)-(ii)(1999). 
While the Utah Supreme Court has determined criminal trespass can be a lesser included 
offense of burglary, that Court has also held the two offenses require different forms of mens rea. 
See State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421,431 (Utah 1986) (Howe, J., concurring and dissenting); State v. 
Baker, 671 P.2d 152,159 (Utah 1983). Although defendant argues the intent to assault required for 
burglary may also fall within the intent to cause injury to any person required for criminal trespass 
statute, the Court disagrees. Assault is specifically defined by Utah Code § 76-5-102 to include 
attempts and threats to cause "bodily injury," another term specifically defined by statute, while 
intent to injure is undefined and could plainly include many types of injury not amounting to bodily 
injury. Moreover, the criminal trespass statute specifically provides it only comes into effect "under 
circumstances not amounting to burglary as defined in Section 76-6-202." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-
202(2). This phrase plainly demonstrates the two statutes, although similar, were intended by the 
legislature to prohibit different conduct. Therefore, burglary and criminal trespass do not address 
exactly the same conduct and are clearly distinguishable because they require proof of different 
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mental states. Defendant was properly charged with burglary without any violation of his right to 
equal protection.1 
ORDER 
WHEREFORE, it is ordered the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and the Motion to 
Dismiss are DENIED. 
Signed this 14th day of June, 2006. 
SAMUEL D 
District Co 
1
 As a procedural matter, the motion to dismiss is untimely where defendant has already 
been convicted However, the Court addresses the issue for the record in this matter. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that, on the day of June, 2006,1 caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing RULING AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS TO WITHDRAW GUILTY 
PLEA AND TO DISMISS to be delivered to the following parties: 
KAY BRYSON 
Utah County Attorney 
Scott Wilson 
100 E. Center St., Suite 2010 
Provo, UT 84606 
SheldenR. Carter 
HARRIS & CARTER 
3325 University Ave., Suite 200 
Provo, UT 84606 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing on this i i S day of February, 2007, by first-class, U.S. Mail, postage 
prepaid to the following: 
Attorney General for the State of Utah (four couies) 
124 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Utah Court of Appeals (eighth copies) 
450 South State 
#500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 
